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Summary :
This paper briefly reviews past policy of the Interstate Commerce
Commission toward railway abandonment and the changes in federal
policy with regard to abandonment provided by the 3R and 4R Acts.
The results of the listing of candidates for abandonment by the
railways are note', and the information relevant for ab?.ndonment
policy provided by impact and cost function studies is summarized.
The role of state rail planning is noted.

Railway Abandonment: What Next?
The abandonment of railway lines, an inevitable product of regional shifts
in economic activity, exhaustion of various resources, competitive overbuilding
in past decades, and the rise of road transport, is not a new occurrence. A
long branch line in southcentral Colorado was abandoned in 1978; the original
line to my home town in California was torn up in 1873; and the entire Colorado
Midland, a major carrier that operated from Denver to Salt Lake City, ceased
operations in 1918. Precise data are available only since the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC) was given control over abandonments by the Transportation
Act of 1920; data of abandonments authorized by the Commission (and applications
denied) are summarized in Table I and given in detail in the Appendix. By 1974
the ICC had approved abandonment of 66,228 miles in total. The rail line
mileage in the United States has declined by about 25% from the peak of the
early twenties to the present time — from 250,000 miles to less than 200,000,
despite some new construction. Apart from the ICC approved abandonments, about
2,000 miles were abandoned through the formation of CONRAIL, and another 2,500
miles have survived only as a result of subsidy. As of the current month,
applications forgutstantial railea^e^^^ pending before the commission.
But what has happened in the past is of minor concern compared to what may
happen over the next decade or so. The issue of appropriate overall govern-
ment policy is a highly controversial one, with extreme positions of George
Hilton and others that from half to three fourths of all mileage might well be
eliminated, through somewhat more moderate but pro-abandonment positions of DOT
officials, to the typical views of State DOTs that, while some abandonment is
clearly Justified, the magnitude does not approach the extreme figures just
noted.

Table I
Summary of I.C.C. Action on Abandonment Petitions
Years Number of Mileage of Percentage Approved Percentage Denied
Applications Applications Applications Mileage Applications Mileage
1920-43 2098 31,829 93 91 7* 9*
1946-63 1479 18,943 89 85 4# 7#
1966-72 735 12,007 75 68 3## 5//#
* includes petitions dismissed.
# 7% of the applications, with 8% of the mileage were dismissed without action.
itif 6% of the applications, v/ith 9% of the mileage, were dismissed, and 16% of
the applications, with 18% of the mileage, had not been acted on at the
end of the period.
Sources: 1920-43: Interstate Commerce Commission, Railroad Abandonments , 1920-
1943 (Washington: 1945, mimec)
.
1946-63: based on data in Michael Conant, Railroad Mergers and
Abandonments (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964),
1966-72: Interstate Commerce Commission Annual Reports .
Past Policy
The Transportation Act of 1920 gave the ICC control over abandonment.
Commission policies in implementation of this power have been analyzed by
1 2Charles R. Cheringtcn, Michael Conant, and others. Basically, the Commission
has sought to balance the losses to the railroad from continued operation
against the losses to the shippers and communities from the loss of the line.
A relatively small loss to a profitable railroad vs. substantially higher trans-
port costs from abandonment would lead to denial; relatively larger losses,
particularly to unprofitable roads and /or small losses to shippers would lead
to approval. Except for the marginal cases, it was relatively easy for the
The Regulation of Railroad Abandonments (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1948).
2
Railway Mergers and Abandonments (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1964).

J -
railroads to predict whether an application would be approved or not, and the
railroads tended not to request those that were likely to be turned down. But
there were marginal situations in which the action of the Commission was
difficult to predict, thus leading to great uncertainty for both shippers and
carriers, liuch of the dispute in abandonment cases centered around the magnitude
of the loss (the railroads tending to pad the figures to strengthen their case)
and the future traffic prospects for the line.
Profitability vs. Economic Viability
The ICC has been widely criticized for restricting abandonment - yet, given the
alternatives the Commission has had, it is difficult to find serious fault
with It. The great majority of applications have been approved, either initially
or after a few years test to see whether additional traffic was forthcoming.
Only 3 to 4 percent have been denied (Table I) and in most of these cases,
abandonment would have led to substantial losses to shippers and to society;
the line was economically justifiable though unprofitable.
There are several sources of discrepancy between profitability and economic
justification of a line. One is the inability of the carrier to adjust rates
to approach perfect discrimination. Shippers as a whole would be willing to
pay enough to cover all costs - but no rate structure to accomplish this result
can be devised. The fact that light traffic lines operate on sharply declining
portions of their average cost curves aggravates this problem. Secondly, there
may be substantial externalities, in the form of added highway costs, pollution,
energy use, and preservation for the communities of opportunities for future
development requiring rail service. The carriers cannot realize from these
externalities except through subsidization. Thirdly, costs of provision of
rail service may exceed economic costs as a result of union contracts that result
in labor costs in excess of economically necessary ones.
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Little can be done by the carriers themselves to eliminate this gap
between profitability and economic viability. The government can give them
greater flexibility in rate structures in an effort to gain a portion of the
consumer surplus or encourage agreements whereby shippers as a group will pay
sums over and above the rates to allow costs to be covered, and can encourage
changes in labor contracts that will bring actual costs closer to economic
costs. But these changes, while adequate in some instances, almost certainly
are not in others, and preservation of the lines requires governmental subsidy.
The basic difficulty in the past had not been with ICC general policy (although
decisions in particular cases can be criticized) but with the fact that the I.C.C.
had only two alternatives - approve abandonment, or force the road to continue
to operate the line under cross subsidy. And there was no way the Commission
could compel a railroad losing money as a whole to continue to operate.
The Three R and Four R Acts
The legal background of abandonment has been altered materially by the
3R and 4R Acts, The first major break came with the legislation designed to
restructure the northeast railroads following the collapse of Penn Central.
The 3R Act, as implemented, allowed exclusion from the restructured system of
all mileage found to be unprofitable; profitability, not economic viability,
was the sole criterion in selecting lines to be included in CONRAIL. Ultimately
some 5757 miles were excluded, and about 2000 miles of this was abandoned with-
out ICC approval. But from a long range standpoint the more significant aspect
of the 3R Act was the introduction of a program of subsidy for lines not in-
cluded in CONRAIL, providing, for two years, Federal subsidy of 70% of the
deficit, if states or local governments took the initiative and provided the
remainder of the subsidy. As of 1977, under the subsidy system, some 2748 miles
were retained in service, much of it in the states of New York and Michigan.
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For the first time the difference between profitability and economic viability
was recognized, but only for a very limited period.
The 4R Act of 1976 completed the implementation of the formation of
CONRAIL, substantially changed the subsidy provisions of the 3R Act, and ex-
tended them to the entire country. It also altered in several ways the general
procedures relating to abandonment:
1. Each railroad was required to file with the ICC and state
authorities a list of lines in four categories: (1) those
for which abandonment will be sought in the next three years
(1977-80); (2) lines under study for possible future aban-
donment, (3) lines for which an abandonment request is pend-
ing, and (4) lines operated under subsidy as provided by the
3R Act.
2. A line a carrier wishes to abandon must be identified as
being in Category i at least four months prior to the aban-
donment application.
3. A carrier seeking to abandon a line must file a Notice of In-
tent 30 days before the application is filed, and the filing
must take place at least 60 days before the proposed abandon-
ment date. If the ICC conducts an Investigation of the aban-
donment, it must order the investigation no less than 55 days
after the filing of the application, complete its hearing
within 180 days, and issue its order within 120 days after the
investigation is completed. This rule is designed to lessen
delays.
4. An opportunity is given for any responsible person to offer
financial assistance subsidy to keep the line in operation, either

-through payments to cover the deficit or for acquisition of the
line. If such an offer is made, the ICC shall postpone author-
ization of abandoDinent for 6 months to ailoxv' negotiation of an
agreement between the persons seeking to keep the line in oper-
ation and the railroad. If no agreement is reached, the ICC may
authorize abandonments reopen the abandonment proceedings, re-
quire operation for one year in return for ICC computed compen-
sation, if the persons proposing the subsidy are willing to pay
this amount, or "take other appropriate measures,"
The subsidy program begun in the 3R Act was substantially expanded:
1. The entire rail network of the country is now subject to the provisions,
2. Federal funds are allocated to the states on a formula basis, relative
to eligible mileage, with a minimum figure.
3. The Federal share of subsidies was 100% for the year ending June 30,
1977, declining to 70% for the years ending in 1980 and 1981 and then termi-
nating.
4. Initiative must be taken by the states and/or local governments or
other parties.
5. The state must develop a rail plan for purposes of analyzing the rail
network to determine those lines warranting support under subsidy and meet other
specified requirements
.
6. The subsidy funds can be used for a variety of purposes, including
covering of operating deficits
^
purchase of lines, iraprovement or alteration
of facilities, etc.
The philosophy of the Federal program is essentially that Federal funds
should be used merely in the transitional period; the belief is that many of
the lines Involved warrant eventual replacement by other forms of transport.
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and that continuing subsidy, if any, should not come from Federal funds.
The program was obviously a step in the right direction, but it does not
recognize that there are substantial numbers of lines that warrant continuing
subsidy, for the reasons previously noted. It can be argued that subsidy to
such lines should be primarily state-local, not Federal, but given the national
nature of the railroad network, the better potential tax revenues of the Fed-
eral government, and the interstate nature of some of these lines, there is
justification for a continuing program of Federal subsidy. A primary problem
at present is that of uncertainty of continuation of the subsidization; thus
shippers are unwilling to locate or expand on lines operated under subsidy.
Furthermore a line is not eligible for subsidy until abandonment is approved;
then a case must be made for subsidy to retain the line, when the case had just
been made to abandon it. This greatly increases uncertainty and influences
ICC action, since the ICC cannot be sure a subsidy will be provided when it
acts on the application to abandon.
Classification of Rail Lines
The 4R Act required the classification of all Class I railroads on the
basis of the "degree to which they are essential to the rail transportation
systems." DOTs preliminary standards and classification report was issued
August 3, 1976: RSPO then held extensive hearings and Issued its critique of
the proposals; and on January 19, 1977 DOT issued its final classification.
DOT classified the total mileage of the country into four categories:
1. A main lines - traffic of over 20 million Gross ton miles per mile (GTM/K)
,
The classification is summarized in J. F. Due, DOT's Classification of
Rail Lines, the Prospective Abandonment Proposals of the Railroads, and the
Hall Commission Report , University of Illinois, College of Commerce Working
Paper #461, 1978.
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plus some additional mileage to reach major markets and to meet national de-
fense requirements. Class A lines totalled about 50 thousand miles, 26% of
the total rail mileage. These are the heavy traffic main lines.
2. E main lines: 5 million to 20 million GTM/M. These are the secondary
m:ain lines, 49 thousand miles, 25% of the total. Thus the main lines together
constitute half of the total rail mileage.
3. A branch lines; 1 million to 5 million GTM/M, 19 thousand miles, or
21% of the total.
4. B branch lines, under 1 million GTM/M, 32 thousand miles or 28% of
the total.
This last category, of course, covers a wide range of lines, down to ones
with 10,000 or less GMT/M.
Corridors of excess capacity are also noted (but the lines are included
in the categories above), and lines for which abandonment is pending, almost
entirely in B branch lines, as noted below.
It is not at all clear at this stage what functions the classification
will serve, except to facilitate overall planning of rehabilitation of main
lines, rationalization of secondary main lines ^ and abandonment of lighter traffic
lines. The classification is by no means a guide to those lines that should ,
be abandoned but merely calls attention to ones warranting review.
The Listing of Candidates for Abandonment
As noted, railroads were also required to list, in addition to pending
abandonment requests, lines for which they planned to request abandonment in
the succeeding 3 years, those under consideration for possible abandonment re-
quests, and those operated under subsidy. The total of the three categories
was about 20,000 miles - or 10% of the total rail mileage. This contrasts
Interstate Commerce Commission, Rail Systems Diagram (Washington:
September 1977). The report is summarized in Due, DOT's Classification,op. cit.
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with the figure presented by the DOT Railroad Abandonments study, which
suggested that 19% of the mileage should be considered for abandonment (though
not necessarily abandoned)
.
Table 2 shows the proposals by state. South Dakota, served primarily by
the Milwaukee, would be most severely affected, losing nearly half its mileage,
including the long east-west line to Rapid City. New Hampshire, with limited
mileage now, would lose nearly a third of its total. Otherwise, the heavy
concentration is in the midwest - V.'isconsin, Iowa, Minnesota, Michigan, and
Missouri, all losing between 13 and 21 percent of their totals. All of these
states suffered from overbuilding in the last century, and Wisconsin and Mchigan
particularly suffer from a dearth of high density main lines. Apart from
four smaller eastern states, which lost substantial mileage upon the formation
of CONRAIL, all of the states with low (4% or under) mileage proposed are in
the south and west, although two western states, Idaho and
Washington, have relatively high percentages.
Table 3 shows the proposals by railroad systems. Of the major roads, the
Mlwaukee has the most drastic, with 37 percent of its milea£.i proposed or
being considered; the Boston and Maine is the only other major road to propose
over 30% of its mileage, and the Chicago and Northwestern the only other one
to propose over 20% of its rail mileage^
Many roads indicated only nominal amounts - the Rio Grande
and the Western Pacific for example. In terms of mileage, the largest blocks -
those over 1000 miles - are indicated by the Milwaukee, the Chicago and North-
western, the Burlington Northern, the Chessie System, and the Illinois Central
Gulf (primarily of ex- Gulf Mobile and Ohio lines) . The roads obviously
U.S. Department of Transportation, Railroad Abandonments and Alternatives
(Washington: May 1976).

Table 2
Potential Abandonments by State
State
outh Dakota
few Hajnpshire
is cons in
'owa
lichigan
lassachusetts
Minnesota
lissouxi
ifashington
Vermonr
Dklahoma
feine
Idaho
Illinois
Mississippi
Maryland
Nevada
Indiana
Louis iana
Florida
West Virginia
North Dakota
Nebraska
California
Mileage
considered
for
abandonment
1520
1218
1433
1030**
243
1179
760
567
94
518
167
277
1061
318
99*
136
567
301
301
231
341
320
i(40
State
Mileage as
% of total
rail mileage
h5
31
21
19
17*
17*
16
13
12
12
11
11
11
10
9
9
9*
8
7
7
7
6
6
Montana
North Carolina
South Carolina
Texas
Ohio
Tennessee
Perjrjsylvania
New York
Ariaona
Arkanscis
Kansas
Kentucky
Oregon
Alabama
Colorado
Connecticut
Georgia
New Jersey
Virginia
UtaJri
Wyoming
Delaware
New Mexico
Rhode Island
Mileage
considered
for
abandonment
297
229
174
839
482
137
3^7
253
76
148
276
171
112
148
102
21
88
38
92
9
9
Mileage as
% of total
rail mileage
6
6
6
6
6*
5
5*
4
4
4
4
4
3
3
3*
2
2*
2
.5
>5
0*
0*
^Significantly affected by formation of Conrail.
'*"*Car ferries omitted.
Source: Interstate Corcmerce Commission, Rail Systems Diagram (Washington:
September 1977).

Table 3
Combined Mileage of Pending Applications and
Category 1 and 2 Lines, by Railroad
Railroad Mileage Percentage
considered of total
for 1975
abandonment mileage
Railroad
5 Superior & Ishperaing
faukee
;on and Maine
l:a,go and Northwestern
gor and Aroostook
jid Trunk Western
Inois Central Gtilf
5sie System
Louis & Southwestern
300
ferries and lines proposing less than 50 miles are excluded.
51 42
3708 37
k2k 32
2130 21
94 17
126 13
119^ 13
1273 11
156 11
i4-6o 10
476 10
192 9
Maine Central 74
Burlington Northern 1607
Union Pacific 568
. .«a 1 L-ri rd Ccas t 1, 1 ae 3.--f.
southern r'c.c"* '"Xc. ,' P c.
Southern Railv.'ay yn
'.'or folk ond '..'.33'>.'rn uy.
; is-.£:our.' P3.c'l-^"c '-^Gr-
T.,ovn.t:vlll<,> and l-.^ahv? life /''v
Icck Islh.nd ^^(j
Kansas City Jou^hern -n
ijanta Ke U-3P:
Mileage Percentage
considered of total
for 1975
abandonment mileage
8
?
6
k
u
differed in their general approach. The Milwaukee and the Chessie Systems
clearly were the most drastic in their approaches. But quite apart from the
approach to abandonment was the approach to listing. The roads are not required
to seek abandonment of those listed in Category 1 or 2, and they can request
abandonment for lines not so listed. Many roads feared that listing of a line
as being under consideration would discourage location or expansion by shippers
on the line. Other managements felt that the listing of a line would encourage
shippers to seek to increase traffic on it to stave off abandonment.
The general impression, and one also noted in the ICC report, is that the
railroads were quite conservative in their listings - that there is no desire
on the part of the railroads for elimination of large amounts of mileage.
Some of the lines proposed have only nominal traffic; one long line in South
Dakota originates/terminates one car per mile per year. The proposals, however,
would leave substantial sections of some states without rail service. The
principal areas are the upper peninsula of Michigan and the upper portion of
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the lower peninsula if the Michigan Northern does not survive; the southwest
quadrant of Wisconsin; much of South Dakota, and large areas in northern
Missouri. Most of the points served are small, but some larger communities
would be left without rail service; examples with population above 5,000 in-
clude Annapolis, Maryland; Gloucester and Newburyport, Massachusetts; Laconia,
New Hanpshire; Houghton, Michigan; Platteville, Wisconsin; Decorah and Clarinda,
Iowa; Port Angeles, Washington; and Boulder City, Nevada.
As of June of 1978, abandonment requests totalling about miles are
before the ICC. There is no evidence that the Commission has changed its basic
policies; it has become no more liberal in approving requests, despite the
possibility of subsidy - in part because federal funds for subsidy cannot be
used until abandonment is approved, and the Commission has no assurance that
subsidy will be provided in particular cases. Another 15,000 miles are likely
prospects for abandonment requests in the next five years.
Impact Studies
As a result of interest in the issue generated by the failure of the
Penn Central, a number of studies of the effects of abandonment on the areas
served is now available; these were summarized in an article in Growth and
2 3Change in 1977, and in the DOT study. Railroad Abandonments and Alternatives .
The general conclusion is that most past abandonments have had little overall
adverse impact, but have caused losses to certain groups, particularly grain
elevators, fertilizer plants, lumber yards and lumber mills, and certain types
An earlier impact study was made by the Interstate Commerce Commission,
published as Railroad Abandonments 1920-1943 (V'ashington: Interstate Commerce
Commission, Bureau of Transport Economics and Statistics, 1945 mlmeo)
.
2
Benjamin J. AJLlen and John F. Due, "Railway Abandonments: Effects Upon
the Communities Served," Growth and Change
,
Vol. 3 (April 1977), pp. 8-14,
op. cxt.
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of manufacturing and wholesale establishments. But with the weakest of the
lines gone, the next series of abandonments is likely to have more serious
effects.
Closely related to these impact studies are those of rationalization of
rail networks in particular areas or states, of which, in the U.S., the Baumel
study of Iowa is outstanding.^ His study concludes that relatively few of the
light traffic lines in that state x-jarrant rehabilitation, that farmers in the
end will gain by consolidation of grain shipments through a staall number of
large subterminal elevators shipping in unit trains on a much smaller number
of rehabilitated lines. But the study recognizes that in the process losses
will be incurred by some shippers and some localities. A similar but much broader
study was that made of the rail network in the Prairie provinces in Canada by
2
the Hall Commiesion. The Commission report recotnmended very substantial re-
duction in rail mileage, for much the same reasons as the Baumel report, although
to a much less drastic extent. Of 155 lines reviewed, 24 would be added to the
basic rail network, 73 would be abandoned, 58 would be retained temporarily,
their ultimate fate to be decided later. The volume of traffic regarded as
necessary for survival, 21 cars originated/terminated per mile, is very low by
comparison with yardsticks commonly used, but grain movements require relatively
infrequent service.
Cost Functions
In the last three years, far better data on railroad cost functions has
C. Phillip Baumel, John J. Miller and Thomas P. Drlnka, An Economic Analysis
of Upgrading Rail Branch Lines , Iowa State Department of Transportation for
Federal Railroad Administration (Washington: U.S. National Technical Information
Service, 1976), summarized in the article by the same authors, "The Economics of
Upgrading Seventy-One Branch Rail Lines in Iowa," Ajnerican Journal of Agricultural
Economics
.
Vol. 59 (Feb. 1977), pp. 61-70.
2
Grain and Rail in Western Canada (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1977),
sunmarized in Due, DOT's Classification of Rail Lines, op. cit., pp. 43-48.
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been developed, particularly in the v7ork of R. G. Karris. The Harris econo-
metric study shows that average cost of Class I railroads continues to decline
over a very wide range of traffic. The basic difficulty with earlier cost
function studies is that they were measuring returns to scale of the enterprise,
not to traffic density on particular lines. The Harris data suggest,
using 1973 cost data and a 4 cent per ton mile competitive trucking cost, that
rail costs are less than truck costs for typical distances only if rail voliome
exceeds 1 million net I'M/M per year - which translates, roughly, into 40 loaded
cars per train (assuming all loaded cars move in one direction) , operating 5
days a week. If the volume is 3 million tons, the figure is down to 2 cents per
ton mile (roughly the rail average cost per ton mile for that year) , and by 6
million to 1% cents. The figure continues to decline slowly beyond that point.
About half of the rail mileage of the country has volume below 3 million
net ton miles and another quarter, density less than enough to allow attainment
of lowest average cost. This conclusion suggests that nearly three fourths of
the mileage of the country represents "excess capacity" in the sense that
operation is carried on at volume less than that allowing lowest average cost.
But obviously excess capacity in this sense does not in itself warrant abandon-
ment, since on much of this mileage rail costs are less than truck costs even
though the rail lines are not operating at the point of lowest long run average
cost.
There are, however, important implications of the Harris conclusions for
abandonment policy (in addition to implications for coal slurry pipe lines, high-
way weight limits J inland waterway improvements, and the like; one of the greatest
Robert G. Harris, "Economics of Traffic Density in the Rail Freight Industry,"
Bell Journal of Economics , Vol. 8 (Autumn 1977) pp. 555-64 j Rationalizing the
Rail Freight Industry , Working Paper SL-7705 Workshop in Transportation Economics,
Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley, 1977.
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mistakes in transport policy in the U.S. has been the failure to consider the
effects upon costs of existing forms of transport of the encouragement of new
forms)
:
1. There is merit in seeking to concentrate traffic on a smaller number
of main lines in the excess corridor areas, with abandonment of segments of
the remaining lines not required for service to Intermediate cities.
2. There is strong justification for continuing subsidization of lines
lacking adequate traffic to allow lowest average cost but with costs lower than
those of other forms of transport, rather than possible abandonment. Only by
this means can rates equal marginal cost - the opportunity cost of continuing
to provide the service - and the low cost form of transport be retained.
The Harris study throws little light on cost functions within the range of
light traffic lines, the one fourth, more or less, with traffic under 500,000
NTM/M. A study at the University of Illinois of cost functions of Class II
railroads concludes that the average cost is phenomenally high - 50 to 75 cents
per ton mile despite very limited service - with volumes under 20,000 NTM/M,
with a very sharp drop in AC as traffic increases. Most of the economies are
being exhausted at a volume of around 150,000 NTM/M, and by 400,000 tons - 30
cars a day - costs approximate those of truck costs. This volume figure is
under half that fsuggested by the Harris work, essentially because Class II rail-
roads can operate light traffic service more cheaply than Class I roads. This
also suggests that actual costs are higher than economic costs for light traffic
lines operated by the m.ajor roads.
Even with the Class II study, however, rail lines cannot operate in com-
petition with truck lines unless their volume exceeds A00,000 NTM/M if the haul
Nan-;y B. Sidhu, Alberta Charney, and John F. Due, "Cost Functions of
Class II Railroads and the Viability of Light Traffic Density Railway Lines,"
Quarterly Review of Economics and Business , Vol. 17 (Autximn 1977), pp. 7-24.
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is entirely on the line, but this is typically not the case. Almost all traf-
fic on the light traffic lines also travels on the main lines. Thus the economic
viability of a light traffic line, other determinants given, is a function of
the length of the line and the average haul on the main line, and of the costs
of transference of freight between rail and truck. The shorter the light traf-
fic line, the more viable it is economically; this is borne out by studies of
past abandonments of Class II roads." Of the very light density lines only the
very short lines, under 10 miles or so, can survive. Table 4 indicates the
typical length of main line haul necessary for light traffic roads of varying
length to be economically justifiable.
Table 4
Length of llain Line Haul Necessary
for Light Traffic Class II Railroads to
be Economically Viable, Typical Conditions
Length of Class
td
Cost of C2.ass II haul per ton mile
II roa
2<; 4c 6.50 13(; 26c
Length of main line haul
5 10 22.5 55 120
10 20 45 110 240*
25 50 112.5 175* 600*
30 100 225 550* 1,200*
100 200 450 1,100* 2,200*
*Indlcates that transfer from rail to truck is cheaper
The actual viability of particular lines is, however, influenced by a
number of factors besides the volume of traffic, the length of the line, the
John F. Due, "Factors Affecting the Abandonment and Survival of Class II
Railroads," Transportation Journal , Vol. 16 (Spring 1977), pp. 19-36.
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the length of the main line haul, and the transfer costs:
1. The loading characteristics of the product. Very light conmiodities
of high value will yield much higher rates per ton mile than low value dense
commodities and still move by rail.
2. The inabilitj' to transport the products by road because of length
and/or weight restrictions.
3. The extent to which the track requires rehabilitation. Many light
traffic lines are in very poor condition, and substantial outlays are required
to place them in satisfactory condition.
4. The quality of rehabilitation required. One reason the Baumel Iowa
study concluded that so few lines warrant rehabilitation was the study's view
that efficient operation required track sufficient to allow a weight limit of
263,000 pounds and 25 mile per hour operation. The speed required is in turn
influenced by the length of the line.
5. The frequency of operation required.
6. Annual maintenance of way expenses, as affected by climate and soil
conditions, and operating expenses as affected by grades, snow problems, etc.
Thus a line of 5 miles in length, hauling high rate commodities that cannot
be moved by highway because of length, with very light loading characteristics,
operation required only once a week, with track in good condition and terrain
and climate favorable and no grades, can be economically justified with a
traffic density only a fraction of that necessary for a 50 mile line handling
only sand and gravel, the track in bad condition and hard to maintain, with
severe grades and shipper requirements for daily service — to take the extremes.
Line Evaluation and the State Rail Plans
This discussion suggests two necessary lines of analysis: review of the
entire rail networks of each region, to seek to rationalize the secondary main
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line network and concentrate the traffic on fewer lines, and a careful analysis
of each light traffic rail line to determine which are economically justifiable.
Clearly the meat axe technique sometimes suggested is not the optimal solution.
Little thus far has been done in regional review except in the restructuring
of the northeast network and to a degree in the work of the Hall Commission in
Canada, and implementation of the recommendations derived from such a study
encounters serious obstacles, especially when more than one railroad is in-
volved. However, a major step is being taken in the analysis of individual lines
in the preparation of the state rail plans.
Under the provisions of the 3R and 4R acts, the states are required
to develop rail plans and have them approved by DOT to become eligible for fed-
eral funds. The states affected by the 3R Act developed their plans in 1975
and have continued to update them; the states not affected by the 3R Act have
been developing them in the last year. At present some of these are completed
(e.g., Missouri, llinnesota, California, Iowa); other states have barely begun
(e.g. Mississippi). The plan volxmes survey the existing rail and other forms
of transp>ort, develop a methodology for determining priorities for retention of
rail lines the carriers may seek to abandon, and evaluate the marginal lines to
establish priorities for funds for preservation. The exact approaches vary
somewhat ; Michigan stresses the benefit-cost ratio; Wisconsin, an index - a
ratio of public benefits to estimated subsidy required; Illinois, the benefit-
cost ratio plus three other variables. In the calculation of benefits,
externalities, such as energy use, pollution, and highway construction costs are
considered as well as more direct gains (retention of industry, jobs, etc.).
In general, of the lines evaluated, in most states half or more are found to
warrant retention through subsidy, some with benefit-cost ratios as high as 15
to 1, but a substantial mileage is found to be virtually useless. In Illinois,
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for example, the benefit-cost ratio of the 22 lines surveyed ranged from 5.7
to .04. The 1978 updated plans review, in the CONRAIL area, the experience
with subsidized lines to date. For example, Illinois experienced excellent
results with the traffic greater and the subsidy much less than anticipated;
Michigan also experienced good results on most but not all the lines; whereas
Indiana experienced very poor results except on two of the lines. The report
stresses uncertainty about future subsidy and retention as a major factor
discouraging firms from locating or expanding on the lines.
The future of the marginal lines thus will depend to a great extent upon
the evaluations by the states of the merits of retention of various lines, and
the continuation of the subsidy programs. The attitudes of the various states
toward continued state subsidy if and when the Federal subsidy ends vary widely.
Conclusions
The abandonment in the past of roughly 75,000 miles of rail line, about 30
percent of the peak rail network, has had little adverse effect on the economy
(though it may have had in some communities) because so much of this involved
unnecessary parallel lines or ones in areas where they no longer served a useful
purpose. But the rail network of the country is still faced with excessive
mileage. First, there is substantial mileage of secondary main lines which,
while providing service at lower cost than trucks, have average costs in excess
of the lowest figures of the high density main lines, thus pulling up the overall
rate level. Secondly, there are many low traffic high cost branch lines. But the
solution is not simply to wipe out vast mileages .as sometimes proposed, as to
do so would raise overall transport costs and interfere with optimal location of
economic activity and development of affected areas.
Far better information is available today than a decade also for dealing
with the problem of abandonment. The line by line analysis of the northeast
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bankrupt lines In the formation of CONRAIL provided information about light
traffic lines in that region, and state rail planning is expanding this to
nationwide scope. The classification of lines under the 4R Act yields data of
traffic volume not previously available, and the listing by the railroads of
lines they regard as candidates for abandonment provides an insight into manage-
ment attitudes. Impact studies provide information on the effects of past
abandonments, and cost function studies have given far more accurate and specific
information about rail costs.
In the area of policy, the principle of subsidy has been established, though
on a limited, presumably temporary, basis, but provision of subsidy had not yet
been integrated with ICC action in abandonment cases. The first step necessary
for improvement of policy is to recognize that for at least half of the rail
mileage, marginal cost is less than average cost because of inability to attain
optimal volumes of traffic. On a substantial portion of this mileage the rail-
road cannot cover costs, but the lines are economically justifiable. Accordingly,
continuing subsidy is warranted, despite the problems that would be encountered,
to hold rates down to long run marginal cost and to recognize externalities,
which over time will become more significant as energy becomes relatively more
expensive. The present subsidy program, v/hile a step in the right direction,
is defective in three respects: the federal program is for a limited period
only and thus expansion of traffic on the lines involved is restricted; subsidy
is available only on lines that are unable to cover their costs; and Federal
funds are not available until abandonment is approved. Some of the state rail
planners (e.g., Indiana) specifically reject the principle of continuing subsidy.
More specifically, the long secondary main lines (not all Class B main
lines, but those with NTM/M under 5 million) need careful reconsideration in
an effort to concentrate traffic on a smaller number of routes, retaining only
I
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segments of the remainder necessary to provide service to intermediate
communities with adequate volume. This requires a regional approach, in-
volving all railroads in the region. In general secondary main lines.
Class A branches, and many Class B branches have costs per ton mile less than
trucking - but their existence raises the overall rail average cost and thus
rate levels. Lines that are essential after consolidation but have inadequate
volume for low cost warrant continuing subsidy roughly equal to the difference
between marginal cost and average cost plus the value of externalities.
For the light traffic lines - those under 400,000 NTM/M - careful evaluation,
as is being provided in part in state rail planning, is essential. Redesign of
the network of light traffic lines to minimize length yet provide adequate
service, often involving shift of segments from one to another railroad, is an
important step. In many instances, the optimal policy is transfer of the line
to operation by small local firms or governmental authorities to allow reduction
in cost. Many major roads are opposed to this step, fearing unreasonable demands
for rate divisions, but the step is essential for maximuiri efficiency and
minimum subsidization, and the major carriers must be protected against such
rate demands. For those light traffic lines remaining with the major systems,
renegotiation of labor contracts to reduce cost and permit the type of experiment
suggested by Ingram in his Farm-Rail approach, is essential. At the same time
that these steps are taken, it is important to eliminate the dead wood from the
rail system - perhaps 10,000 miles, including segments of secondary main lines
no longer required for through service.
John F. Due
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